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CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH AND DYNAMIC STABILITY:
THOUGHTS ON RELIGION, CONSTITUTIONS, AND
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY
DAVID GRAY*
To declare that religious and political authority have a tense rela-
tionship hardly deserves a sleepy blink.  More than a few heads have
rolled on both sides; the “problem” of religion is a ubiquitous, ener-
getic, and often tiresome topic in both post-transitional constitutional
movements1 and among those who live under existing constitutions.2
The frequent subtext in constitutional debates about religion is that
constitutions should, on the whole, be secular documents, descriptive
of secular institutions, and fundamentally protective of norms and
practices susceptible to secular justification.  The presumption is that
constitutions could do just fine without religion.  In fact, a purely sec-
ular society is, in some fashion, the utopian dream of the constitu-
tional state and inheres in the very idea of constitutionalism as a
solution to political questions of authority and legitimacy.  Recipro-
cally, theocracies have their own answers to these questions, and have
no need for a historical or profane foundation to justify claims of le-
gitimacy or authority, though a worldly edifice by definition is
required.
So, constitution does not need religion, and religion does not
need constitution, and purely as a teleological matter, both imagine
Copyright  2009 by David Gray.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.  This Essay grows
out of an extended project addressing jurisprudential issues core to transitional justice
debates. See David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and Odious Debt,
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2007); David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transi-
tional Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2621 (2006); David Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transi-
tional Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); David C. Gray, What’s So Special About
Transitional Justice? Prolegomenon for an Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 100 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 147 (2006).  This Essay has benefitted from discussions with and en-
couragement from Mark Graber and Fred Gedicks.
1. See, e.g., J. BRYAN HEHIR ET AL., LIBERTY AND POWER: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2004) (discussing the role, if any, that religion
plays in United States foreign policy).
2. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (examining whether
readily visible postings of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky county courthouses
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality opinion) (examining
whether a monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments located by the Texas State
Capitol violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
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the other as silt in the water that eventually will filter out.  One can
imagine hearing constitution, back from yet another interminable
teˆte-a`-teˆte with religion, sighing, “Oh for a world governed by science
and reason, free from the weight and friction of ancient supersti-
tions,” while religion, sequestered away in its own apartments, medi-
tates on constitution’s incapacity to give itself to Truth as a matter of
faith or, just for once, to suspend its demand for proof and inter-sub-
jectively valid explanation.  Add Art Carney and Walter Matthau, and
you might have something.
While religion and constitution are an odd couple indeed, the
fact is that they live together in some form everywhere constitutions
are found.  The explanation is hardly tenure-worthy.  Constitutions,
like all other human endeavors, are bounded by context3 and it is
hard to identify a cultural artifact more ubiquitous than religion.
Every society has at least one religion, and, at this stage, almost every
significant national border contains many.4  Religion is not just every-
where, it has been around since long before recorded history and
does not appear poised to exit the stage anytime soon.  The religion
“problem” for constitutions, then, is how to accommodate religion in
a secular shell.5  Rough and irresponsible ethnography provides some
support for the broad thesis that the degree and form of accommoda-
tion is a function of religiosity and diversity.  Peoples dominated by
one religion tend to write constitutions that recognize an official state
religion and, consistent with what Lon Fuller might call the “morality”
of constitutions,6 provide protections both for minority faiths and for
the faithlessness.  Iraq is a good example.7  Less faithful peoples and
3. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 79, 103 (J.
Sibree trans., Dover Publ’ns 1956) (1837) (arguing that, in contrast to the Universal Spirit,
the spirit of a People and their forms of government are necessarily bound to context,
including geography and history); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Considerations on the Government
of Poland (1772), in POLITICAL WRITINGS 159, 159, 162 (Frederick Watkins trans., Thomas
Nelson & Sons 1953) (arguing that the form of a government must reflect the geographic
and cultural landscape of its people).
4. See, e.g., IRAQ CONST. art. 2, 3, available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/
iraqi_constitution.pdf (“Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects.”).
5. See Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues,
Contexts, Concepts, in CITIZENSHIP IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 1, 1 (Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman
eds., 2000) (asserting that, with regard to multi-ethnic societies, political theory must ad-
dress both the rights of ethnocultural minorities and the responsibilities of democratic
citizenship).
6. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 102–06 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that rule
of law norms, such as the prohibition against ex post facto enforcement of law, are internal
to the logic of the law itself).
7. IRAQ CONST. art. 2 (pronouncing Islam as the “official religion of the State” while
“guarantee[ing] the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people and guarantee[ing]
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those who confront a social world inhabited by several fairly equally
well-represented religions tend to avoid establishment, but neverthe-
less guard jealously a place for religion in civil society protected by the
state.  The United States lies on this region of the spectrum.8  Cling-
ing on a bit farther down are nations like France, which seem poised
to give up on religion altogether and appear increasingly dumb-
founded by the faithful in their midst.9  Painting with a broad brush,
then, it seems that constitutions accommodate religion to the degree
that they must, but largely plot a trajectory toward greater secularity in
public life and, eventually, in private life.  For its part, religion guards
jealously its sphere of influence in civil society and often seeks to ex-
pand its footprint into public political life by, inter alia, placing believ-
ers in positions of authority,10 affecting legislation, and sometimes
changing constitutions to reflect faith-based beliefs.11
Assuming that these observations are true, I want to explore the
possibility that constitutions should not merely accommodate religion
where it is found and where it is too entrenched to move, but should
encourage a flourishing diversity of religions as a mainstay of civil soci-
ety.  Communities of faith play an important role in maintaining in
society what I will call “dynamic stability.”  Looking at the question of
constitution and religion through the lens of transitional societies, I
suggest that emerging constitutional societies should not only secure a
place for religion in society, but should take affirmative steps to ex-
pand the diversity of faiths represented in society.  This last bit is cru-
cial.  While it is beyond the scope of this Essay to explore the issue
extensively, the lessons of transitions ancient and current is that the
association of state power with a single religion, and particularly any
breed of fundamentalism, is terribly dangerous.  Constitutions must,
the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice of all individuals such as
Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans”).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
9. See Molly Moore, As Youth Riots Spread Across France, Muslim Groups Attempt to Inter-
vene, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2005, at A1 (describing the religious violence that erupted in
Paris, France, in 2005).
10. See generally JEFF SHARLET, THE FAMILY: THE SECRET FUNDAMENTALISM AT THE HEART
OF AMERICAN POWER (2008) (documenting the efforts of a secretive religious organization
called “The Family” to recruit, place, and maintain associations with powerful political
figures in the United States and abroad).
11. Religious organizations have, for example, played a prominent role in state consti-
tutional debates about the status of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, U.S. News: Gay
Marriage in Peril in California, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2008, at A4 (explaining that the Utah-
based Church of Latter-day Saints contributed “[b]etween 30% and 40% of the $25.5 mil-
lion in donations” raised to support Proposition 8, a state ballot measure to prohibit gay
marriage in California).
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then, take care.  They ought generally to recognize and protect a role
for religion in civil society.  Constitutions must, however, avoid select-
ing among religions or allowing a single religion to achieve domi-
nance as the definitive marker of national identity.  I begin with a
brief account of what I mean by “dynamic stability.”
I. DYNAMIC STABILITY
I have argued elsewhere that much of the transitional justice liter-
ature misunderstands the challenges and misses significant theoretical
and practical opportunities because it views transitional justice as a
special case of “ordinary justice.”12  In particular, it fails to take nor-
mative account of both the “justice gap”—the radical disparity be-
tween justice needs and the resources available to transitional
regimes—and the underlying cause of that gap—the complex of cul-
tural norms, social practices, institutional regimes, black letter law, of-
ficial policies, institutional practices, social norms, cultural ideology,
and historical teleology.  Together, these elements provide the or-
ganizing ontology and justificatory ethic of abusive regimes and ratify,
induce, and sustain programs of mass violence.13  Of course, all socie-
ties, even stable states, are, to borrow from E. E. Evans-Pritchard, “seg-
mented”—constituted of many smaller groups and associations which
stand in opposition to competing groups and associations.14  These
divisions frequently reflect the same “bipolar logic”15 that drives most
abusive regimes—Nazi vs. Jew,16 Hutu vs. Tutsi,17 and so on.  In addi-
tion, just as is the case in abusive regimes, in stable states, individuals
are loci of contests between opposed groups.  Groups compete for the
loyalty of potential members or mark their borders by excluding some
12. See, e.g., David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2621, 2622–23 (2006) (arguing that the treatment of transitional justice as “ordi-
nary justice” does not solve the obstacles to transitional justice). But see Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 765 (2004)
(contending that the issues that arise in situations of transitional justice are “at most over-
blown versions of ordinary legal problems”).
13. Gray, supra note 12, at 2623–25. R
14. E. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE NUER 147–48 (1940); MAX GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND
CONFLICT IN AFRICA 1–2, 8, 17 (1956).
15. See JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END 83–89 (1996) (describing the bipo-
lar logic that characterizes many abuse systems, as evidenced by the Argentinean military
regime).
16. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS 23 (1996) (arguing
that the Holocaust was the expression of an “eliminationist” mode of anti-Semitism that
had developed in Germany long before the Nazis assumed power).
17. See generally PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE
WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998) (describing the role of
ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in the 1994 Rwandan genocide).
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and including others.  Members on each side look haughtily across
the divide with a sense of entitled privilege, sure that they are natu-
rally superior and confident that they are destined to prevail at the
end of history.  Yet, in stable states, these oppositions seldom if ever
descend into violence, and certainly do not succumb to sustained and
institutionalized violence.  “Why” may seem a riddle; yet, the answer is
both transparent and profound.
It is common and relatively intuitive to say that oppositions divide
us.  Be they economic, racial, religious, cultural, or ethnic, fundamen-
tal or silly and petty, we all regard each person around us as “other” in
some way.  In recognition of these divisions, many leaders implore us
to set aside our differences and celebrate a universal essence that
unites us in common above, beyond, and despite our differences.18
While rhetorically seductive, such pursuits are not only folly; they are
dangerous.  This is because a robust multiplicity and variety of seg-
mentary oppositional relationships allows societies to achieve and
maintain stability.19  That stability is by nature and necessity dynamic,
rather than static; it is, however, by virtue of that dynamism, and not
in spite of it, that societies are able to maintain stability.  Societies that
incorporate this dynamism into their cultural, political, and economic
practices are supple and flexible in the face of internal and external
challenges.  By contrast, societies that reify a single identity and raise
to preeminence a particular line of oppositional association are terri-
fyingly brittle, unstable, and poised on the precipice of disaster, await-
ing only a trigger event to lead them into aggressive violence and
chaos.  Behind sweeping calls for unity lies the specter of a final
solution.
Societies composed and recomposed by dynamic cross-sectional
associations are far more stable than isolated groups or amorphous
groups of unassociated individuals.  Intra- and inter-group conflict is,
of course, inevitable.  In Evans-Pritchard’s terms, forces of fission con-
stantly arise.20  If individuals existed in one-dimensional social uni-
verses, there would be no hope of limiting conflict or restraining
violence when fissures appear.  However, individuals who exist at the
nexus of numerous different lines of association inevitably find that
self-interest and recognition are far more complex than might appear
in the face of an immediate fission within or between groups.  Thus,
18. See, e.g., Barack Obama, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 25 (2006) (urging citizens of the
United States to remember that “despite all our differences . . . we share[ ] common
hopes, common dreams, a bond that will not break”).
19. GLUCKMAN, supra note 14, at 17–18, 24. R
20. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 147–48; GLUCKMAN, supra note 14, at 8–9. R
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in a web of diverse and overlapping associations, forces of fusion drive
competing members and groups together even as intersecting opposi-
tions push them apart.21
In keeping with the concept of dynamism, different lines of asso-
ciation and opposition and linked forces of fusion and fission shift
and change.  They wax and wane, often in reaction to the source and
nature of a conflict or threat.22  To again adopt vocabulary from Ev-
ans-Pritchard, threats on the national level drive tribal groups to-
gether, suffusing inter-tribal conflicts.23  Clan rivalries fade into the
background in the face of inter-tribal conflict and group identities
nearly disappear in the absence of an identity-activating opposition.24
In a well-functioning and relatively stable society, however, these cross-
sectional associations never disappear entirely.  As a result, conflict,
and more importantly violence, is controlled, regulated, and con-
strained.25  Overall cohesion is preserved even in the face of appar-
ently fundamental and intractable disagreements by offsetting forces
of fission with forces of fusion imposed by commitments to multiple
intersecting lines of association and opposition.26
Take the United States in the last election cycle as an example.
As the rhetoric heated up in September and October of 2008, we were
again subjected to the trope that the United States is fundamentally
divided between Democrats and Republicans.  While exaggerated,
that picture is not entirely unrealistic.  Were the bipolarity implied in
the division between Blue and Red determinative of identity and as
dominating as pundits would have it, the United States might be ripe
for a politically driven genocide.  Fortunately, it is not.  One potential
explanation for this is a persistent solidarity in faith to a higher level
of association.  We are all Americans first, and Democrats or Republi-
cans second.  That account begins to lose credibility, however, in face
of the fact that, at its most powerful, the contest between Democrats
and Republicans is precisely about what America is, or at least what it
21. GLUCKMAN, supra note 14, at 24–26; see also POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 8 (Marc J. R
Swartz, Victor W. Turner & Arthur Tuden eds., 1966) (describing the forces that act on
political fields).
22. See EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 142–43 (describing the segments within R
Nuer tribes and their dynamics regarding conflict).
23. Id. at 142–43.
24. Id. at 147.
25. GLUCKMAN, supra note 14, at 8–9.  Another controversial contributor to the ethno- R
graphic canon, Napoleon Chagnon, has made similar observations regarding the role that
kinship and other political ties play in constraining forms of violence that may be used to
express opposition. See NAPOLEON A. CHAGNON,  160 (1968) (explaining that
the  avoid attacking villages with which they feast and trade).
26. EVANS-PRITCHARD, supra note 14, at 147–48; GLUCKMAN, supra note 14, at 24–26. R
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ought to be.  Adherents to each of the parties are not particularly in-
vested in living in the America of the other.  In the midst of highly
contested elections, rhetoric often trails off into discussion of “the
real” America and wholly sincere suggestions that members of the
other party are not “real” Americans at all.27
That even this most fundamental line of fusion—namely, that we
are all Americans—is subject to fission is not, as it might seem, a rea-
son for despair.  To the contrary, it reveals the descriptive power of
the account of social cohesion sketched here.  Our society is divided
and defined according to a wide variety of oppositions and associa-
tions, of which political affiliation is but one.  We are divided by polit-
ics, yes, but also by race, gender, religion, sexuality, economic status,
education, alma mater, and affiliations with sports teams.  Yet, we stay
together.  We do so not out of faith to a meta-identity, but because
each of these oppositions implies a reciprocal and complementary as-
sociation.  I might look in bewildered wonderment at my colleague
who supports the other candidate in the upcoming election, sure that
his views and party are destined for the dustbin of history, while at the
same time recognizing him as a colleague, friend, and coach of my
child’s little league team.
The resulting picture is an extensive system of overlapping Venn
circles, locating for each of us a unique position in society.  More im-
portantly, however, the implied logic game of existential sufficiency
reveals the dynamic stability achieved through those intersecting fields
of association and opposition.  Some Democrats are of African de-
scent.  Some African-Americans are Ravens fans.  Some Ravens fans
are Republicans.  That web of inclusion and exclusion maintains rela-
tive stability and social tranquility by ensuring that whatever point of
difference is highlighted at a particular time, pushing a society to seg-
ment, those who face each other across the divide are simultaneously
drawn to each other, fused through collateral pathways of affiliation
and identity.28
27. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)
(recognizing the core oppositions represented among the factions that populated the bud-
ding union).
28. Seeing this reveals the fundamental danger inherent in the political rhetoric of
Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin and Presidential candidate John McCain at the end
of the 2008 election.  Claims that then-candidate Obama was a mystery, an associate of
terrorists, “not like us,” or not from the “real America” or “real Virginia,” proposed to deny
him what Hannah Arendt has called his “specificity,” and to identify him with one domi-
nant point of opposition. See Posting of David Gray to Concurring Opinions, http://
www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/01/mccainsage_of_s_1.html#more (Jan. 31,
2009, 18:55 EST).  The insinuation of terrorist ties was particularly insidious because it
marked a point of opposition far too powerful to be counterbalanced by any other associa-
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James Madison observed the potential for diversification to main-
tain stability in Federalist No. 10.29  There, picking up a theme devel-
oped by Hamilton in Federalist No. 9, Madison takes up the problem
of factions.  As exclusive and relatively small interest groups, factions
represented to Hamilton a great threat to the stability of the union.30
Madison was sympathetic to these concerns,31 but took a radical tack
on the solution.  Madison recognized that factions are an inevitable
outcome of freedom.  Absent a tyrannical authority, human nature
will always lead individuals to pursue their own interests, forming fac-
tions with those who are like-minded and who have similar interests.32
Rather than seeing factions as dangers to the union, however,
Madison saw the dangers of factions as perhaps the strongest argu-
ment for a large republic encompassing all of the individual states.33
His insight was simply that factions will have a more difficult time
forming dangerous single-minded majorities in a larger republic with
a broader diversity and larger number of competing factions.34  More-
over, the process of attempting to form a majority around any particu-
lar issue would force members of different factions to recognize and
work with one another, a process that inevitably would dilute both
orthodoxy and the ability of any faction to tyrannize others.35
There is, of course, much more that can be said about the details
of dynamic stability and its role in preserving public order.  For pre-
sent purposes, however, it is enough to have this sketch in mind as
prelude to a brief account of how regimes become abusive and how
otherwise normal people, people just like us, become agents of
genocide.
tion.  John McCain seemed to sense the danger in this trend when responding to an audi-
ence member at a rally who accused then-candidate Obama of being an “Arab.”  Senator
McCain emphasized that Obama is a father, a family man, and a loyal American, just like
us, except a Democrat—an identity that should cause no citizen to fear him. Id. While
Senator McCain was much criticized for this response, the discussion here makes clear that
his instinct in the face of a proposed line of segmentation to emphasize collaterally shared
associations was the correct one. Id. To simply correct the record by putting Barack
Obama on the “non-Arab” side of the proposed line would have been to reify a line of
segmentation between those of Arab descent and those not, deepening a line of social
fracture with potentially violent possibilities.
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 45. R
30. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 27, at 35, 38. R
31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 27, at 46 (acknowledging R
that “factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States”).
32. Id. at 41 (“The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man . . . .”).
33. See id. at 40 (observing that a “well constructed Union [has the] tendency to break
and control the violence of faction”).
34. See id. 45–46.
35. See id. at 46.
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II. LOSS OF DYNAMIC STABILITY AS PRELUDE TO VIOLENCE
What distinguishes abusive regimes from stable states is a cata-
strophic failure in this web of dynamic stability—a shift that normally
is precipitated by crisis.  In contrast with stable states, where there is a
diversity of associations and oppositions, abusive regimes are domi-
nated by one associational identity that occupies a central place across
a number of economic, political, and social fields.36  That dominance
reifies a corollary line of opposition, and limits the ability of cross-
secting terms of association and identification to preserve broader,
more inclusive, systems of social cohesion and to restrain violence.
This pathological segmentation leads to a momentary lapse in the
“general need for peace, and recognition of a moral order in which
this peace can flourish,”37 opening the door to violent realization of
the mainstays of an abusive paradigm; a normative ontology and his-
torical teleology endemic to whichever line of opposition (and, there-
fore, association) thus assumes a position of dominance.
This suppression of competing cross-group associations was a
highlight, for example, in Nazi Germany.  While the threads of an
eliminationist anti-Semitism were already part of the social weave by
1933 when Adolf Hitler was elected Chancellor,38 Aryans, Jews,
Romani, and other non-Aryans had lived together in relative, if some-
times tense, peace, in part because other social, economic, and even
family ties cross-cut the ethnic divide.39  What drove the Holocaust was
the totalizing emphasis on race and the association of Aryanism with
nationalism, which unleashed, first in halting steps, and then in full
sprint, the eliminationist energy inherent in anti-Semitism.
Similarly, while Rwanda in 1994 had a long history of ethnic ten-
sion between Hutus and Tutsis, conflict was controlled and violence
was restrained by a host of deep lines of cross-secting association.
Hutus and Tutsis had intermarried for generations.40  They attended
the same schools and churches, engaged in commerce, and shared
desks in the bureaucracy.  In the spring of 1994, however, in the face
of a perceived threat from Tutsi rebels in the North from Burundi,
Rwandan Hutus were called to abandon their associations with Tutsis
36. See Gray, supra note 12, at 2629–36 (describing abusive regimes and the abusive R
public face of law in these regimes).
37. GLUCKMAN, supra note 14, at 25. R
38. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 16, at 87. R
39. Cf. ERIC L. GOLDSTEIN, THE PRICE OF WHITENESS: JEWS, RACE, AND AMERICAN IDEN-
TITY 14 (2006) (noting that the 1870s saw marriages of Jews and non-Jews in the United
States occur on a “small but previously unheard of scale”).
40. GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 47–48. R
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who were their neighbors, co-workers, spouses, and friends and to
show complete and exclusive allegiance to their ethnic group.  As in
Nazi Germany, national identity in Rwanda was collapsed into ethnic
identity as the paradigm of Hutu Power, with its historical narrative
and social ontology of ethnic supremacy, rose to dominance with cata-
strophic results.
III. OSSIFICATION AND DYNAMISM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROMISE
AND DANGER OF RELIGION
Given this brief account of dynamic stability, the ambiguous role
of religion is clear.  Religion can certainly occupy the definitive role in
an abusive paradigm.  Alternatively, religious associations, because
they cross-sect numerous other lines of opposition, can provide a pow-
erful force of fusion, constraining forces of fission exerted by overlap-
ping oppositions of race, class, and politics.  In this last section, I
briefly explore this duality and suggest that writers and interpreters of
constitutions should approach the problem of religion not as a de-
mand for accommodation, but as an opportunity to sustain and ex-
tend dynamic stability.  While a full investigation of the best
constitutional form to accomplish that goal must wait, I suggest that
the anti-establishment but pro-religion stance taken in the United
States Constitution provides a promising model as compared to con-
stitutions, such as Iraq’s, that recognize an official state religion.
Religion, coupled with race and ethnicity, tops the charts as a
source for abusive paradigms.  It is at least nominally at the center of
conflicts across the Middle East.41  Religious difference also occupied
a central place in the long battle over Irish independence.42  Likewise,
ethnically tinged religious opposition provided an ordering force in
conflicts across the Balkans during the 1990s.43  Reaching farther
back, religion played a key role in justifying, even if not motivating,
conflicts ranging from the Crusades44 to colonialism.45  Given this his-
41. See, e.g., Edward Wong, The Conflict in Iraq: Government; Top Iraq Shiites Pushing Relig-
ion in Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, §1, at 1 (explaining that, during the drafting of
Iraq’s constitution, religious Shiite parties in Iraq were pushing for Islam to be the guiding
principle for the constitution).
42. See CLAIRE MITCHELL, RELIGION, IDENTITY AND POLITICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1–3
(2006) (discussing the prominent role that religion played in the Northern Ireland
conflict).
43. See MICHAEL A. SELLS, THE BRIDGE BETRAYED: RELIGION AND GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA
xiii–xiv (1998) (asserting that the national religious mythology of Serbia played a crucial
role in the conflicts across the Balkans during the 1990s).
44. See MARCUS BULL, Origins, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES 15, 29–34
(Jonathan Riley-Smith ed., 1999) (describing the role that religion played in recruitment,
development, and enthusiasm during the Crusades).
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tory, it is tempting to conclude that religion is a dangerous beast in-
deed, and in rare company for its ability to inspire and justify the
targeted violence that is a hallmark of abusive regimes.
Stepping back to indulge in a bit of abstraction seems to confirm
the case.  Take, for example, the limitations of religion as a partici-
pant in public debates.  Pressed to make its case for or against a partic-
ular policy, religion’s views are quick to come up as question-begging.
Almost by definition, religion’s views on almost any matter proceed
from a bedrock commitment to accept without external questioning
an institution, doctrine, text, or personality’s statement of the Truth.
That foundation of assumed premises is quickly exposed in open dia-
logue and there is little more to say to those who do not share the
commitment of faith that is the foundation of religious consciousness.
Once this shallow bedrock has been reached, religion seems to be left
with only two options if an independent secular ground for its views is
not available—conversion or violence.  Given this, it appears that any
religion with public political aspirations is necessarily committed to a
project of hegemony.  All that remains is the question of means.
This, or something like it, is the particular danger of fundamen-
talism.46  Again painting in broad strokes, fundamentalist strains of
religious traditions distinguish themselves from more moderate forms
of faith by rejecting even the possibility of fallibility while at the same
time nurturing a belief in historical immediacy.  This sets up a stark
opposition not only between the faithful and the rest, but also be-
tween those of the true faith and those regarded as apostates.
Religion, then, and particularly in fundamentalist form, is com-
mitted to line-drawing.  It defines the social world in stark terms.  In
addition, common narratives internal to religious faith, including no-
tions of deific favor, salvation, and prophesies of the end times, pro-
vide a natural source for the normative ontology and historical
teleology that frequently drive mass atrocities.  Given even some of
these points, the constitutional preference for secularism seems to
gain some traction.  While, as a purely practical matter, few constitu-
tional movements can declare open hostility to religion, there seems
to be a good case for setting a tone with constraint and then letting
religion die a natural death.
45. See DAVID CHIDESTER, SAVAGE SYSTEMS: COLONIALISM AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 11–12 (1996) (explaining that the colonists often “assert[ed] that peo-
ple had been found who lacked any religion”).
46. See JAMES BARR, FUNDAMENTALISM 9 (1977) (noting that the phenomenon of funda-
mentalism is a “fact of world religion”).
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One reason to resist that temptation is the plain fact that the his-
tory of religion in the world is not all bad.  Quite to the contrary,
religion and religious figures are prominent in the Pantheon of
peacemakers.  From Gandhi to Martin Luther King, to Desmond
Tutu47 and Alex Boraine,48 the world-historical religious figures with
public legacies of peace are legion.  More privately, religion is a com-
mon motivator for acts of charity and love too numerous to list.  It
seems, then, that the potential for religion, particularly religion prop-
erly channeled, to do this much good in the world is more than
enough to make a case for creating and maintaining constitutional
space for religion.
In closing this short Essay, I would like to suggest another reason
that constitutions should both encourage and preserve a place for re-
ligion in civil society.  That reason is straightforward in light of the
above offered account of dynamic stability.  While religion is naturally
and by definition exclusive, religious communities are, for the same
reason, also inclusive.  Implied in the marking of some as other is the
acceptance of others as self.  Inclusion implies exclusion by definition,
while opposition by necessity entails association.  However, few reli-
gions by nature trace the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in the
faith along collateral lines of race, gender, class, or any number of
other social markers.  To the contrary, most religions invite member-
ship from a broad spectrum of individuals across other exclusive com-
munities, thereby providing an important source for cross-secting
association.  There are other sources of ecumenical association, of
course, but religion is unique in at least one crucial respect.  Ethnicity,
race, gender, and, to a large extent, class, are birthrights.  For the
most part, religion is not.  Quite to the contrary, most religions are in
one fashion or another evangelical and grow, in part, by converting
new members to the faith.  As distinct from most other associations,
then, religious groups hold out the unique potential to push against
the tendency toward ossification and crisis posed by more inflexible
institutions and affiliations, the memberships of which are existen-
tially determined.
Religion, then, is an important player in the construction and
maintenance of dynamic stability, though it, like many other sources
47. See generally DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS (2000)
(describing his experience as the Anglican Archbishop of Capetown and the Chairman of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa).
48. See generally ALEX BORAINE, A LIFE IN TRANSITION (2008) (describing his life exper-
iences, including his work as the deputy chair of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the President of the International Center for Transitional Justice).
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of fission and fusion, carries the potential to destroy in its acts of con-
struction.  This suggests that any political society facing the architec-
tural tasks at the fore in constitutional movements should reserve a
central place for religion in its plans for future peace and stability.
The form by definition will be unique to the circumstances and at any
rate would require far more than can be accomplished in this short
Essay.  The framework for the discussion is easier to speculate about,
however.
Religion has the potential to destroy by assuming a position of
dominance in society and coupling its aspirations to state power.  Re-
ligion also has the potential to limit the capacity of other exclusive
communities to achieve dominance in society and pursue programs of
oppression and targeted violence.  The key to the problem of religion
in constitutions is, then, to preserve space for religion in civil society
while guarding against its hegemonic leanings and destructive poten-
tial.  The results of this struggle are likely to look quite familiar.  In
particular, constitutions should protect religion explicitly and should
be particularly keen on religious diversity.  Constitutions should not
establish or endorse a single religion, and constitutional authorities
should avoid adopting religiously based truth claims as state policy in
the absence of compelling secular justifications.  This is hardly radical
stuff, but this modest effort will have been worth the candle if the
ideas outlined here provide more and perhaps different reasons to
confirm and maintain the compromise reflected in our own and many
other constitutions that address the problem of religion while also
suggesting to constitutional movements in emerging states that they
think carefully about the destabilizing potential of either recognizing
an official state religion or mandating secularity in civil society.
